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450 South State Street 
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Re: Joel Sill v. Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction 
Appellate Case No. 20050245-CA 
Court: 
Under cover of this letter, Appellee Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction, provides to the 
Court a copy of the following case authority that is supplemental to those authorities cited in the 
Brief of Appellee that is on file herein: Robert Pearson, d/b/a Robert Pearson Construction v. 
Suzanne J. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383. This supplemental citation is provided now because it is a 
ruling of this Court made after briefing in this case was completed. 
The Pearson case pertains to two of the issues raised in the parties' briefs in this above-
referenced pending appeal. First, the argument of Appellant {e.g., Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-21) 
that Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), the statute at issue both in this case and in the Pearson case, 
is "mandatory" and therefore a "jurisdictional" bar to certain mechanics' lien claims. Pearson, 
2005 UT App. 383 1fl[7-l2 (holding it is not "mandatory" or "jurisdictional"). Second, the 
argument of Appellee (Brief of Appellee, pp. 30-32) that the district court's ruling that the statute 
does not apply to this case in any event should be upheld as being in accord with the underlying 
purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to protect those who provide labor and materials that add 
value to the property of another. Pearson, 2005 UT App. 383 1fl}8 & 11 (noting and upholding that 
policy). 
Sincerely, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
BLT/jd 
Enclosure 
cc: David B. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant, w/encl 
c
~^^ BradleyJ^Tilt 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
ill Suzanne J. Lamb (Defendant) appeals the trial court's denial 
of her motion for a new trial, in which she argued that the 
failure of Robert Pearson (Plaintiff) to comply with Utah Code 
section 38-1-11 (4) (a) divested the trial court of jurisdiction. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (a) (2001) . We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In October 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking 
foreclosure of a mechanics' lien. Defendant filed her answer in 
December 2 002 and an amended answer and counterclaim in February 
2003; neither pleading contained allegations that Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Mechanics' Liens 
Act. On April 12, 2004, the parties filed stipulations of fact 
with the district court, stipulating that 
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the 
statutory procedural requirements for 
perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics' 
lien . . . ; Mrs. Lamb does not defend 
against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim 
on these statutory procedural grounds, but 
simply challenges his right to receive 
payment of the amounts claimed in the lien. 
A bench trial was held thereafter, and the district court entered 
a memorandum decision in favor of Plaintiff on April 20, 2004. 
1J3 On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed a motion for 
reconsideration (which she now dubs a motion for a new trial), in 
which she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the foreclosure action because Plaintiff failed to comply with 
the requirements of section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens 
Act. The trial court, on June 16, 2 004, issued a ruling and 
order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and on July 28, 
2004, entered a Final Order and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
^4 The only issue before this court is whether Plaintiff's 
failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' 
Liens Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff's mechanics' lien foreclosure action. If Plaintiff's 
failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the 
trial court of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that Defendant 
waived that issue, not only by failing to assert it prior to 
trial but also by stipulation. 
f5 The determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
determination. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,i|8, 
31 P. 3d 1147. Questions of statutory interpretation are 
similarly questions of law that are reviewed "for correctness, 
giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." 
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,1(8, 94 P.3d 234. 
ANALYSIS 
%6 Under section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act, 
lien claimants filing an action to enforce a lien must serve on 
the defendant-owner of a residence instructions relating to the 
owner's rights and a form affidavit along with the complaint. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4)(a) (2001). Pursuant to section 
38-1-11(4) (e) , "[i]f a lien claimant fails to provide to the 
owner of the residence the instructions and form affidavit 
required by [s]ubsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be barred 
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from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." Id. 
§ 38-1-11(4)(e). On appeal, Defendant argues that the language 
of section 38-1-11 (4) (e) makes subsection 4(a) "mandatory," 
thereby making it a jurisdictional provision that cannot be 
waived and can be raised at any time. Defendant thus contends 
that Plaintiff's failure to comply with requirements of section 
38-1-11(4)(a) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff's lien foreclosure action. 
%7 Whether a procedure prescribed by statute is jurisdictional 
depends on whether the procedure is "mandatory" or "directory." 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 
1996). And while a procedure is generally considered "mandatory" 
when "consequences are attached to the failure to act," Stahl v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980), the purpose of 
the statute and the legislature's intent are of the utmost 
importance: 
There is no universal rule by which directory 
provisions may, under all circumstances, be 
distinguished from those which are mandatory. 
The intention of the legislature, however, 
should be controlling and no formalistic rule 
of grammar or word form should stand in the 
way of carrying out the legislative intent . 
. . . The statute should be construed 
according to its subject matter and the 
purpose for which it was enacted. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1978) (alterations in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see also Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 ("A statute is, of 
course, to be construed in light of its intended purposes."). 
Therefore, "[a] designation is mandatory, and therefore 
jurisdictional, if it is 'of the essence of the thing to be 
done.'" Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other 
quotations and citations omitted); see also Projects Unlimited, 
Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 
1990) ("We must determine whether the rigorous interpretations 
urged by [defendants] are necessary to protect the interests of 
the parties in the instant situation. Unless we find that 
[Plaintiff's] alleged failures have compromised a purpose of the 
mechanic[s'] lien statute, those failures will be viewed as 
technical . . . . " ) . 
1(8 The Mechanics' Liens Act was passed primarily to protect 
laborers who have added value to the property of another, but 
also to protect the property owner's right to convey clear title: 
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[T]he purpose of the mechanic [s1] lien act is 
remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or 
labor. On the other hand, we recognize that 
liens create an encumbrance on property that 
deprives the owner of his ability to convey 
clear title and impairs his credit . . . . 
State legislatures and courts attempt to 
balance these competing interests through 
their mechanic[s1] lien statutes and judicial 
interpretations thereof. 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743 (quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 
(Utah 1989) ("[T]he mechanic[s'] lien law was enacted for the 
benefit of those who perform the labor and supply the materials 
. . . " ) . We must therefore balance a laborer's right to be paid 
for his labor and materials with the negative impact that liens 
have on an owner's credit and her ability to convey clear title. 
Plaintiff's failure to serve Defendant with instructions and a 
form affidavit is irrelevant to the lien's negative impact, 
whereas invalidating Plaintiff's right to be paid for his labor 
simply because he made a procedural error clearly contravenes the 
intended purpose of the Mechanics' Liens Act. Quite simply, the 
requirements of section 38-1-11(4) (a) have nothing to do with 
"the essence of the thing to be done," Beaver County v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quotations and citations 
omitted), and Plaintiff's failure to comply therewith did not 
compromise a purpose of the Act. 
i[9 Furthermore, the procedures set forth in section 38-1-
11(4)(a) are not "mandatory" because no consequences attach to 
the failure to act. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481. The omission 
could have been remedied at any time during the course of the 
proceedings, or, had the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's 
mechanics' lien foreclosure action for failure to adhere to 
section 38-1-11(4) (a), the dismissal could have been easily 
addressed by either refiling or, depending on the timing, through 
Utah's savings statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2002). 
Under Utah's savings statute, 
[i]f any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, . . . [the plaintiff] 
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may commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
Id. 
HlO Although Plaintiff may have failed to serve Defendant with 
the instructions and form affidavit required by section 38-1-
11(4)(a), there is no question that he commenced his action 
within due time. "A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a 
complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together 
with a copy of the complaint." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). And 
section 38-1-11(1) gives lien claimants twelve months after 
completion of the contract, or 180 days after the lien claimant 
last performed labor, to file suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
11(1). Here, Plaintiff performed labor at the residence 
throughout the spring of 2002 and filed his complaint seeking 
foreclosure in October 2002. Because Plaintiff's action was 
timely commenced and a dismissal for failure to adhere to section 
38-1-11(4) (a) would have been a dismissal "otherwise than upon 
the merits," id. § 78-12-40, Plaintiff could have remedied his 
failure simply by commencing a new action within one year after 
the dismissal. 
i|ll Unlike "mandatory" designations, "a designation is merely 
directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with 
a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the 
business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to 
those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Beaver County 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744-50 
(upholding a lien despite its errors because such errors were 
technical and the defendant suffered no prejudice). Therefore, 
Utah courts have held that certain procedures required by statute 
are inconsequential to a court's jurisdiction. For example, in 
Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 113, 
the court determined that a mailing requirement of the Medical 
Malpractice Act was not jurisdictional, stating that construing 
the statute "in a manner to impose jurisdictional consequences on 
a claimant's every procedural stumble is to misapprehend the 
Medical Malpractice Act [] . " Id. at 1Jl4. While the court "[did] 
not ignore the fact that the requirement . . . [was] mandatory," 
it stated that the mailing requirement was "a minor component of 
the Malpractice Act's prelitigation scheme. It serve[d] a wholly 
informational role, and it is difficult to envision how 
[defendants] could be prejudiced by being deprived of [the 
mailing]." Id. at fl7. And in Kiesel v. District Court, 96 Utah 
156, 84 P.2d 782 (1938), the court interpreted a statute 
requiring a plaintiff to file an undertaking, or bond, securing 
costs contemporaneously with the complaint. The court held that 
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the statute, while affording no discretion to the court, still 
did not create a jurisdictional prerequisite: 
The language of [the statute], while positive 
and mandatory, when considered altogether 
makes the requirement only that the 
undertaking be filed contemporaneously with 
the complaint. This certainly is no stronger 
than the language of [other] statutes which 
require the bond to be filed before 
commencing action. But we think the 
legislature intended to make the requirement 
so positive and unequivocal as to require the 
court to dismiss the suit if the bond was not 
filed at least contemporaneously with the 
complaint if [al motion to dismiss was timely 
made. Otherwise, the court could continue to 
take jurisdiction. 
Id. at 784.* 
fl2 Like the statute construed in Kiesel, the requirements of 
section 38-1-11 (4) (a) are not conditions precedent to filing 
suit; they simply require action contemporaneous with the filing 
of the complaint. Furthermore, like the Medical Malpractice Act 
construed in Labelle, the Mechanics' Liens Act creates numerous 
procedural hurdles to enforcing a lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-7 (2001) (delineating the contents of a notice of lien, and the 
time frame in which it must be filed); id. § 38-1-11(1), (2) 
(delineating the time frame in which suit and a lis pendens must 
be filed). Section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act 
simply requires that certain instructions and a form affidavit be 
served on the defendant; these requirements are "wholly 
informational" and but "a minor component" of the Mechanics' 
Liens Act. Labelle, 2004 UT 15 at i l l . Finally, like the 
1Other jurisdictions have held that certain "mandatory" 
procedures are inconsequential to a court's jurisdiction. See 
Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Constr. Co., 546 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting a statute that required a 
contractor to provide a residence owner an affidavit prior to 
bringing suit, the court stated that "[a] 1though the furnishing 
of the affidavit is a condition precedent to bringing an action 
to foreclose a mechanic[s'] lien, failure to do so does not 
create a jurisdictional defect"); Campbell v. Graham, 357 P.2d 
366, 368 (Colo. 1960) (interpreting a statute that barred 
businesses that had not filed trade name affidavits from 
prosecuting suits, the court rejected the proposition that trade 
name filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit). 
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defendants in Labelle, it is difficult to envision how Defendant 
here was prejudiced by being deprived of the instructions and 
form affidavit required by section 38-1-11(4) (a). Defendant has 
not alleged that she was prejudiced. In fact, she even 
stipulated that she was not defending against the lien 
foreclosure on statutory procedural grounds, but simply 
"challenge[d] his right to receive payment of the amounts claimed 
in the lien." Quite simply, the requirements of section 38-1-
11(4)(a) are "directory, and therefore not jurisdictional," as 
they merely concern "the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of 
the business" and Defendant has suffered no prejudice. Beaver 
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
if 13 Defendant cites numerous cases involving the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act [UGIA], stating that the UGIA's notice 
requirement is comparable to the requirements of section 38-1-
11(4)(a). Such an analogy is erroneous, as the UGIA's notice 
requirement has nothing whatsoever to do with service and mailing 
but instead provides that a claim against the state is barred 
unless notice thereof is filed with the state within one year 
after the cause of action arises. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
402 (2004); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 
1980). In this way, the UGIA's notice requirement is far more 
analogous to Utah Code section 38-1-11(1) and (2), which mandates 
that a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and a lis pendens must 
be filed within twelve months after completion of the contract or 
180 days after the lien claimant last performed labor. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1), (2). And like a party's failure to 
adhere to the UGIA's notice requirements, a party's failure to 
timely file a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and lis pendens 
is fatal and cannot be remedied: 
The penalty for not commencing an action to 
enforce a mechanic[s1] lien within the 
twelve-month period provided in section 38-1-
11 is invalidation of the lien . . . . When 
a claimant fails to file the lis pendens 
within the twelve-month period, the lien 
itself is not invalidated, but rather it is 
rendered void as to everyone except those 
named in the action and those with actual 
knowledge of the action. 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 
P.2d 738, 751 n.13, 752 (Utah 1990). Utah courts have thus ruled 
that failure to timely commence a mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action and file a lis pendens, like failure to timely notify the 
state of a claim against it, divests the court of jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Interlake Distribs., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 
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1295, 1297-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that liens were void 
because plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens); Diehl Lumber 
Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("Failure to commence a timely mechanic[s1] lien foreclosure 
action divests the court of jurisdiction."); AAA Fencing Co. v. 
Raintree Devel. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-91 (Utah 1986) 
(holding that an untimely mechanics' lien action is a 
jurisdictional issue and "forecloses [the parties'] rights"). 
%14 Comparison between the requirements of section 38-1-11(4)(a) 
and the UGIA is misplaced also because Utah courts have 
specifically held that the UGIA is to be "strictly construed," 
Great W. Cas. Co. v. Utah Pep't of Transp., 2001 UT App 54,19, 21 
P.3d 240, whereas "substantial compliance with the [Mechanics' 
Liens Act] is all that is required," Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 
295, 215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950) (relating to the legal sufficiency 
of the notice of lien); see also Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 
743 ("Utah courts have recognized that substantial compliance 
with [the Mechanics' Liens Act's] provisions is all that is 
required."). "Although courts have differing opinions about how 
liberally to construe provisions within their mechanic [s'] lien 
statutes, the modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules 
which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact pattern." 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Here, Plaintiff substantially complied with the Act, 
to such an extent that Defendant did not even notice Plaintiff's 
oversight until May 2 004, more than eighteen months after the 
complaint was filed and more than one month after Defendant 
stipulated that Plaintiff had "complied with all the statutory 
procedural requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a 
mechanics' lien." Furthermore, Defendant did not allege how the 
instructions and form affidavit required by section 38-1-11 (a) 
would have conferred any demonstrable value here, but instead 
argued that such value (or lack thereof) was "irrelevant" and "of 
no import." Therefore, Plaintiff's failure to adhere to section 
38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Hl5 Since Plaintiff's failure to adhere to section 38-1-11 (4) (a) 
did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, we affirm the 
trial court's Final Order and Judgment in favor of, and its award 
of reasonable attorney fees and costs below to, Plaintiff. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001) (awarding reasonable attorney 
fees to the "successful party" in a mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action). Because "[t]he general rule is that when a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal," Utah Pep't 
of Soc. Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 
20040613-CA 8 
1991), we remand the matter to the district court for calculation 
of attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal. 
*h 16 Affirmed and remanded. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
H17 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Kl8 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal transferred from the 
Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code § 3 8-1 -11 (4)(a) (2001) as 
not requiring Appellee Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart"), an original or general 
contractor, to serve various referenced instructions and forms upon Joel Sill ("Sill") when 
Hart served Sill's attorney with a mechanics' lien foreclosure counterclaim in a lawsuit 
filed by Sill. 
The issue raised on appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation. The trial 
court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,117, 977 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1999). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes are applicable to this appeal:1 
Utah Code § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001): [Mechanics' Liens] Enforcement -Time for 
-Lis pendens --Action for debt not affected -Instructions and form affidavit and 
motion. 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed 
under this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 
38-11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the 
complaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the 
owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to 
enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon 
which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, 
Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund 
Act. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code § 38-11-107 (2001): [Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act] Restrictions upon maintaining a lien against residence or 
owner's interest in the residence. 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied 
residence and the real property associated with that residence 
under the provisions of Title 3 8, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, 
who provides qualified services under an agreement effective on 
or after January 1, 1995, other than directly with the owner, shall 
be barred after January 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon 
that residence and real property or recovering a judgment in any 
The parties are in agreement that the statutes determinative of this appeal are those that 
were in place when Hart filed his counterclaim that is the subject of this appeal in 
February of 2002. See e.g., Brief of Appellant, 2 n.l. Unless otherwise specifically 
noted, therefore, all citations to and quotations of statutory provisions that appear in this 
brief are to the versions that were in effect in February of 2002 (i.e., those appearing in 
the 2001 version of the Utah Code). 
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civil action against the owner or the owner-occupied residence to 
recover monies owed for qualified services provided by that 
person if: . . . . (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code § 38-11-204 (2001): [Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act] Claims against the fund -Requirement to make 
a claim -- Qualifications to receive compensation. 
(3) To recover from the [Residential Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery F]und, regardless of whether the residence is occupied 
by the owner, a subsequent owner, or the owner or subsequent 
owner's tenant or lessee, a qualified beneficiary shall establish 
that: 
(b) the owner has paid in full the original contractor, licensed or 
exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, real estate developer, or 
factory built housing retailer under Subsection (3)(a) with whom 
the owner has a written contract in accordance with the written 
contract and any amendments to the contract, and: . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This action was filed by Sill, who filed a complaint claiming, among other things, 
that Hart, an original general contractor with whom Sill had directly contracted, had 
breached the parties' agreement for the construction of improvements to certain real 
property owned by Sill (the "Property"). (R. 1-33). After being served with Sill's 
complaint, Hart filed an answer that also included a counterclaim (the "Counterclaim"). 
(R. 34-36; R. 37-58; R. 59-81). In his Counterclaim Hart sought, among other things, to 
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foreclose a mechanics' lien Hart had recorded on the title to the Property in order to 
secure payment from Sill for the improvements Hart had made to the Property. (R. 53-
55, 57; R. 76-78, 80). 
Two and a half years later, in the week just before the start of the trial, Sill for the 
first time raised to Hart an argument that Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure claim was 
allegedly defective because Hart had not served upon Sill (i) instructions relating to rights 
available under Utah's Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (Utah 
Code § 38-11-101 et seq. - hereinafter, the "Lien Recovery Fund Act"), and (ii) a form 
affidavit and motion for summary judgment for Sill to file with the court below to 
exercise rights under the Lien Recovery Fund Act. Sill argued that service of such 
instructions and forms was required of Hart under Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes ("Subsection (4)(a)"). Sill further argued that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to rule upon Hart's mechanics' lien Counterclaim since he had not 
served such items upon Sill with the Counterclaim, allegedly based upon Section 
38-1-1 l(4)(e) of the mechanics' lien statutes, which stated that "[i]f the lien claimant fails 
to provide the owner of the residence the instructions and form affidavit required by 
Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien 
upon the residence." The parties reserved for post-verdict determination the issue of 
whether Hart was required to comply with Subsection (4)(a). (R. 1050-52). 
After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart, awarding him a principal 
amount of $314,500.00 on his unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien claims, plus interest 
and attorney fees and costs. (R. 1188-93). 
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Hart then attempted to reduce the jury's verdict to a judgment. Sill opposed that 
effort only insofar as it included entry of judgment for prejudgment interest, and attorney 
fees and certain costs, and a foreclosure of the mechanics' lien. Sill argued that Hart was 
entitled to those items only on his mechanic's lien claim, but that Hart's mechanic's lien 
claim was barred because Hart had not served upon Sill with Hart's mechanics' lien 
foreclosure Counterclaim various instructions and forms referenced in Subsection (4)(a) 
of the mechanics' lien statutes regarding rights available to certain homeowners under the 
Lien Recovery Fund Act. (R. 1244-48, 1369-79, 1383-94, 1411-20, 1448-53). 
After extensive briefing by the parties, Sill's Subsection (4)(a) arguments came on 
for hearing before the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Judge Deno G. Himonas presiding. After the hearing, on February 4, 2005, 
the trial court issued a "Memorandum Decision" (the "Decision") declaring: 
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah 
Legislature limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner 
with the materials referenced in Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in 
which the lien claimant was initiating an action through service of a 
complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' without 
more is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial 
proceeding, including counterclaims" {Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal 
Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the 
reference to "service of the complaint." Second, this reference to a 
complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement of a lawsuit 
and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See 
e.g., Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 
82; see also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced 
(1) by filing of a complaint. .., or (2) by service of a summons together 
with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from 
other pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it 
could have easily provided for it (e.g., by substituting the words "initial 
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pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)). [R. 1464 (Decision, p. 3 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added))]. 
Since Sill (rather than Hart) filed this action and served a "complaint," and since 
what Hart filed was an Answer that included the Counterclaim in this case that was 
initially filed by Sill, the trial court held Hart was not required to serve upon Sill any of 
the materials referenced in Subsection (4)(a), that Hart's lien foreclosure Counterclaim 
therefore was valid, and that Hart was therefore entitled to recover prejudgment interest, 
attorney fees, and costs. (R. 1462-66 (Decision)). 
Consistent with the Decision, a "Final Judgment, Order and Decree of 
Foreclosure" (the "Order") was signed, approved as to form by legal counsel for Sill, 
and was then submitted to and was entered by the trial court on February 24, 2005. The 
Order, among other things, confirmed the validity and enforceability of Hart's 
mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim and declared the Property foreclosed pursuant 
to Hart's Counterclaim in order to pay the amounts declared to be due and owing to Hart 
fromSill. (R. 1467-71). 
It is the Decision and Order which are the subject of Sill's appeal. Copies of the 
Decision and Order are attached hereto as Addenda Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. At all times relevant to this case, Sill was the owner of certain real property 
located in Summit County, Utah, which is the subject of this case (identified and referred 
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to above, and hereinafter, as the "Property"). {See e.g., R. 1-33 (Sill's Complaint, fflf 4, 
10.) ; .. 
2. Sill, as the owner, contracted directly with Hart, as the original or general 
contractor, for certain improvements to be made to the Property. (See e.g., R. 1-33 
(Plaintiffs Complaint, f^ l l );p. 3 of the Brief of Appellant ("Sill's Brief')). 
3. In January, 2002, Sill filed this action and a complaint against Hart 
claiming, among other things, a breach of the parties' agreement for the improvements to 
the Property. (See e.g., R. 1-33; Sill's Brief, p. 
4. Sill thereafter served his complaint on Hart. (See e.g., R. 34-36). 
5. At all times throughout this action, including when Sill first filed this 
action, Sill has been represented by legal counsel. (See e.g., R. 1-33; trial court's docket 
generally). 
6. In February, 2002, after the filing of this action by Sill, and after the filing 
and service of a complaint by Sill against and on Hart, Hart filed an answer to Sill's 
complaint, which answer included a counterclaim, and later an amended counterclaim 
(identified and referred to above, and hereinafter, collectively, as the "Counterclaim") in 
which Hart sought, among other things, to foreclose upon a mechanics' lien Hart had 
recorded on the title to the Property to secure payment from Sill for Hart's improvements 
made to the Property. (See e.g., R. 37-58; R. 59-81; Sill's Brief, p. 3). 
7. Hart served his Counterclaim by mail upon Sill's attorneys of record in this 
case. (See e.g., R. 58; R. 81). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly interpreted Subsection (4)(a) as being inapplicable to Hart 
on the facts of this case, and this Court should uphold the trial court's Decision and 
Order. Subsection (4)(a), on its face, specifically and expressly applies only "if" the lien 
claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint" on a homeowner to foreclose a 
mechanics' lien. In this case it was Sill who filed the action and served a complaint upon 
Hart. As the defendant in the case, Hart obviously never filed or served any complaint on 
Sill. Rather, Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure is instead a part of Hart's Counterclaim. 
On its face, therefore, Subsection (4)(a)'s requirement of service of certain instructions 
and forms with a "complaint" when a lien claimant "files an action" expressly does not 
apply to this case. Sill's arguments for application of Subsection (4)(a) to the facts of this 
case depend upon and require linguistic contortions by this Court of the clear and plain 
language of the statute as chosen and drafted by the Legislature. Such distortions are 
inappropriate and in derogation of established rules of statutory construction. 
Additionally, the contorted reading of Subsection (4)(a) that Sill asks the Court to 
adopt would be of absolutely no benefit to him in any event. The instructions and forms 
referenced in Subsection (4)(a) of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes, and that Sill argues 
should have been served on him, relate solely to rights available to certain homeowners 
in certain circumstances under the Lien Recovery Fund Act. In this case, however, Sill 
admittedly and indisputably has no rights at all under the Lien Recovery Fund Act. To 
begin with, the Lien Recovery Fund Act only protects homeowners from liens of 
subcontractors - not original general contractors - and Sill admits that Hart was not a 
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subcontractor, but rather the general contractor with whom he had contracted directly. 
Moreover, the Lien Recovery Fund Act protects homeowners (from liens and claims of 
subcontractors only) only after the homeowner has paid the general contractor in full, 
which Sill did not do. Sill therefore fails the requirements of the Lien Recovery Fund 
Act and has no rights under it. Since Subsection (4)(a) relates only to service of 
instructions and forms relating to the homeowner's rights under the Lien Recovery Fund 
Act, and since Sill has no such rights of any kind in this case, Subsection (4)(a) does not 
require service of the referenced instructions and forms in this case which simply do not 
apply and would be of no value or benefit to Sill whatsoever. 
This Court also should uphold the trial court's interpretation of Subsection (4)(a) 
because it is in harmony with, and should reject Sill's desired interpretation which is 
contrary to, the long-recognized legislative purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to 
protect those such as Hart who perform work upon and provide improvements to real 
property. Sill's argument for application of Subsection (4)(a) as an impediment to Hart's 
lien claims in this case is contrary to the very language of Subsection (4)(a) itself, and to 
the mechanics' lien laws generally, all in an attempt to gain a windfall for himself in the 
form of a luxury home built by Hart without fully paying for it and the attorney fees and 
costs that Hart has had to expend attempting to collect the amounts due and owing to him 
by virtue of Sill's refusal to pay.2 This Court should not reward Sill with such a windfall 
2
 Recovery of attorney's fees is vitally important to the mechanic's lien scheme. "The 
purpose of the mechanic's lien is to protect those whose labor or materials have enhanced 
the value of property. [The attorney fee provision of the mechanic's lien statutes] 
strengthens that protection by ensuring that someone who successfully uses a 
to Hart's substantial detriment, and indeed cannot as a matter of law under the express 
language as well as the legislative history of the statutes. This Court should instead 
uphold the trial court's Decision and Order declaring Subsection (4)(a) inapplicable, and 
otherwise not any bar, to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim herein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SUBSECTION (4)(a) 
HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE. 
A. The Plain Language of Subsection (4)(a) On Its Face Does Not Apply to 
Hart's Counterclaim Filed In This Case 
This Court should affirm the trial court's well-reasoned Memorandum Decision 
ruling that Hart was not subject to any requirement to serve any instructions or forms 
under Subsection (4)(a) because the plain language of Subsection (4)(a) simply does not 
apply to the admitted facts of this case. 
At the time Sill initiated this action by filing his complaint, Subsection (4)(a) read 
as follows: 
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed 
under this chapter involving a residence ... the lien claimant shall 
include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the 
residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the 
owner's rights under [the] Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
mechanic's lien to enforce a payment obligation for such enhancement will not ultimately 
bear the legal costs of that enforcement action. It also functions as a penalty for one who 
wrongly fails to pay for enhancement to his property." AX.& R. Whipple Plumbing and 
Heating v. Guy, supra, 2004 UT 47,124, 94 P.3d 270, 276. 
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(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to 
enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds 
upon which the owner may exercise available rights under 
[the] Lien Recovery Fund Act. [Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
11 (2001) (emphasis added)]. 
On its face, Subsection (4)(a) specifically, clearly, and expressly applies only "if' 
the lien claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint" on a homeowner to foreclose 
a mechanics' lien. On its face, therefore, Subsection (4)(a) simply does not apply to this 
case in which it is Sill, the homeowner, who is the plaintiff that filed the action and 
served a complaint. As the defendant, Hart obviously never served a complaint on Sill. 
Rather, Hart's pleading was an answer that included a compulsory counterclaim to 
foreclose his mechanic's lien. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a)3; Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a).4 
It is well-settled that when interpreting a statute the court must interpret the actual 
words appearing on the face of the statute itself, according to their plain and ordinary 
meaning, and that the court may "look beyond the plain language only if [it] fmd[s] some 
ambiguity." State v. Burgess-Beynon, 2004 UT App 312, 99 P. 3d 383. When faced 
with questions of statutory construction, courts must presume "that each term in the 
3
 Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) states: 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-
party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the 
provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No 
other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or 
a third-party answer, (emphasis added) 
4
 Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) states in relevant part: 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing 
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the 
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third 
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, (emphasis added) 
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statute was used advisedly." Gillman v. Sprint Comm. Co., L.P., 91 P.3d 858, 860 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2004). Also, "any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute 
inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 282 (Utah 
2000). 
The Utah Legislature was very precise when it designated only one of the six 
pleadings allowed under Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (i.e., a complaint) as being subject to the 
requirements of Subsection (4)(a). The Legislature could easily have required that the 
instructions and summary judgment forms referred to in Subdivision 4(a) be served with 
"the complaint or the answer containing a counterclaim," or simpler yet, the Legislature 
could have used the term "pleading" or "initial pleading," instead of "complaint." It did 
not. Rather, it specifically and expressly referred exclusively to a "complaint" as the 
pleading with which certain summary judgment instructions and forms must be served.5 
The trial court rightly concluded, therefore, that the Legislature meant what it said in 
Subsection (4)(a) and used the term "complaint" purposefully and advisedly in limiting 
the types of "an action" in which a lien claimant is required to serve the referenced 
summary judgment instructions and forms upon a homeowner. 
5
 The existence of Utah Code Sec. 78-7-35 confirms unequivocally that the Legislature 
knows there are various different types of pleadings that may be filed in a lawsuit. That 
statute separately delineates the filing fees that apply to a "complaint," and to a 
"counterclaim," "crossclaim," "complaint in intervention," and "third party complaint." 
This confirms that the Legislature's exclusive reference to the filing of a "complaint" in 
Subsection (4)(a) was purposeful, and must be respected and enforced by the Court. See 
e.g., State v. Hobbs, 64 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (in statutory construction 
the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another, and omissions in statutory 
language must be taken note of and given effect); Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 36 
P,3d 528, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (same). 
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Any interpretation of Subsection (4)(a) that would broaden its application beyond 
cases in which the lienholder itself first files the action and serves a "complaint" on the 
homeowner renders the Legislature's careful wording inoperative and meaningless. 
Since Subsection (4)(a) on its face expressly applies only when a lienholder first files an 
action and serves the homeowner with a "complaint," and since neither of these things 
occurred in this case, Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to Hart's mechanic's lien 
foreclosure Counterclaim. This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's ruling. 
i. None of SilPs arguments make Hart's Counterclaim into a 
"complaint" that would be subject to Subsection (4)(a) 
In trying to make the square peg of this case fit into the round hole of 
Subsection (4)(a), Sill tries several ways to make Hart's Counterclaim appear to be a 
"complaint." In addition to being contrary to the plain language of Subsection (4)(a) 
itself and all of the rules of statutory construction noted above, each of Sill's arguments 
also fails for the reasons discussed below. 
a. There is no such thing as a "counterclaim complaint" 
Sill first tries to satisfy Subsection (4)(a) by repeatedly referring to Hart's 
Counterclaim as a "counterclaim complaint." Use of the term "counterclaim complaint" 
was a tactic that Sill attempted without avail in his memoranda filed with the trial court. 
There is no such thing, however, as a "counterclaim complaint." Rule 7(a) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure (both state and federal) define the various types of pleadings that exist 
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in civil matters. There is no mention of any such thing as a "counterclaim complaint" in 
those rules, which conclude by stating "[n]o other pleading shall be allowed." See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). 
Sill cites four cases in support of his claim that the term "counterclaim complaint" 
nevertheless is "routine": Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 138 
(3rd Cir. 2001); Foundation for Interior Design Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art & 
Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001); Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co. v. Ellis, 28 
F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994); Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 1, 67 P.3d 1000. 
Aside from the fact that four isolated references to the use of such term in courts 
throughout the entire country is hardly "routine," none of Sill's four cited cases is of any 
avail to him in any event because there was no substantive significance attached by those 
courts to their occasional loose use of the term "counterclaim complaint." Certainly none 
of those cases dealt with Subsection (4)(a) which is at issue in this case, nor even 
involved any statutory language expressly referring specifically and only to a 
"complaint" as a document triggering application of certain statutory requirements, as 
Subsection (4)(a) does. 
This Court should not use a made up term like "counterclaim complaint," whether use 
of such a term is "routine" outside of the mechanics' lien context or not, to circumvent the 
express language of Subsection (4)(a), and its direct and specific reference to a "complaint" 
as the exclusive pleading with which various other forms must in certain cases be served on a 
homeowner. To do so would render the Legislature's use of the term "complaint" in 
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Subsection (4)(a) meaningless, "inoperative or superfluous [and] is to be avoided." See e.g., 
Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 282 (Utah 2000). 
b. The American Rural interpretation of "action" under 38-1-18 
does not apply to the fundamentally different language of 
Subsection (4)(a) 
Sill also argues that bringing a counterclaim is the same thing as filing an action 
and serving a complaint for purposes of Subsection (4)(a). Sill purportedly bases that 
argument upon the statement in American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 
939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), that "a counterclaim to foreclose [a] mechanics' lien 
... clearly qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce any lien' under the mechanics' lien 
statute." (Sill's Brief, p. 15 (citing American Rural, 939 P.2d at 193). From that Sill 
argues the Legislature must have intended to adopt the American Rural interpretation of 
"action" as including a counterclaim when it used the word "action" in Subsection (4)(a) 
that was enacted four years after the American Rural decision. (Sill's Brief, p. 15). 
However, Sill's argument is fatally flawed because of, and indeed is contradicted by, the 
striking difference in the statutory provision at issue in American Rural and what the 
Legislature later said in Subsection (4)(a). 
The statute at issue in American Rural was Utah Code Section 38-1-18, regarding 
awards of attorney fees. At the time of the American Rural decision, that provision 
stated, in its entirety: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by 
the court, which shall be taxed as a cost in the action. (Emphasis added). 
The expansive language of section 38-1-18 allowing fees to the prevailing party 
"in any action brought" is markedly different than the conditional and restrictive 
Subsection (4)(a), which states that certain forms and instructions are to be served only 
"if' the lien claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint" on the homeowner. The 
fact that in Subsection (4)(a) the Legislature chose to have that provision apply only in 
certain limited circumstances " i f certain facts are present is a major distinction from 
section 38-1-18 which the Legislature stated applies in "any" action.6 Most importantly, 
however, is Subsection (4)(a)'s statement of what must be present for it to apply -
specifically, the lien claimant must be the one who "files an action" and serves a 
"complaint." "Filing" an "action" is different than "bringing" a counterclaim, as shown 
unequivocally by the Legislature's use in Subsection (4)(a) of the term "complaint." The 
addition of that qualifying term shows the Legislature's intent to distinguish and limit the 
term "action" as used in Subsection (4)(a) from the expansive definition that applies 
under 38-1-18 as interpreted for that section by the American Rural decision. Had the 
Legislature intended that same expansive definition to apply under Subsection (4)(a), it 
would have left the term "action" unconditioned and unqualified as it did in 38-1-18; it 
Sill argues that the American Rural Court placed no significance on the word "any" in 
the language of section 38-1-18. He focuses on the fact that the American Rural Court 
said that a counterclaim "clearly qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce any lien' under 
the mechanics' lien statute." (Sill's Brief, p. 19 (quoting American Rural, 939 P.2d at 
193 (emphasis added by Sill)). Sill's argument is an attempted distinction without a 
difference, since the Court's ruling in American Rural was interpreting the language of 
38-1-18, which at the time, as it does now, referred to "any action." 
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would not have added to Subsection (4)(a) the conditional term " i f and the limiting and 
qualifying reference to a "complaint." 
Sill argues that "it is simply not reasonable to conclude.. .that the word 
'complaint9 serves to restrict the term 'action,' such that 'action' does not include a 
counterclaim." (Sill's Brief, p. 19). In making that argument Sill relies upon Wilson v. 
Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. App. 1999) and Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 533 
F.Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) to suggest that other courts find a "complaint" and a 
^counterclaim" to be effectively the same thing. Sill's reliance on these two cases, 
however, is misplaced. To begin with, neither of those cases dealt with the type of 
mechanic's lien statute at issue in the case at bar where there is a clear and express 
reference to service of a "complaint" as the triggering event for something. In fact, both 
of those cases actually support the trial court's ruling in the case at bar that the Utah 
Legislature's exclusive reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to 
or include counterclaims. That is because the statutes at issue in the Wilson and the 
Brink's cases both expressly equated the term complaint with the term counterclaim. 
Wilson, 519 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting the statute there at issue as prohibiting bringing "a 
complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal custody" in two situations, one of which 
included "as a counterclaim or in any other manner in response to a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus seeking to enforce a child custody order"); Brink's, 533 F.Supp. at 1123 
n.3 (quoting the dispositive statute in that case as stating that "[a] cause of action 
contained in a counterclaim or a cross-claim shall be treated, as far as practicable, as if it 
were contained in a complaint"). Those statutes, and therefore those cases, stand in stark 
contrast to Utah's Subsection (4)(a) at issue in this case, which refers exclusively to a 
"complaint," and draws no parallel at all between a complaint and a counterclaim. The 
exclusive reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) qualifies and gives meaning to 
the term "action," as the trial court correctly reasoned, and must be respected and 
enforced. See e.g., Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 282 (Utah 2000) ("[A]ny interpretation 
which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided."); 
Gillman v. Sprint Comm. Co., L.P., 91 P.3d 858, 860 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (courts must 
presume "that each term in the statute was used advisedly"); State v. Hobbs, 64 P.3d 
1218, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (in statutory construction the expression of one thing 
implies the exclusion of another, and omissions in statutory language must be taken note 
of and given effect); Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 36 P.3d 528, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001) (same). 
c. Sill's own authorities confirm that a "complaint" is different 
from a counterclaim 
Sill argues that the "commonly accepted meaning" of the terms "action" and 
"complaint" appearing in Subsection (4)(a) includes counterclaims. That argument, 
however, is contrary to his own cited authorities and his recognition of the governing 
rules of statutory construction that courts must presume "each [statutory] term is used 
advisedly," and that "each term in a statute should be interpreted according to its usual 
and commonly accepted meaning." (Sill's Brief, p. 16 (citations omitted)). For example, 
Sill himself correctly points out that the "commonly accepted meaning of 'complaint'" is: 
• "The initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis 
for the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiffs claim, and the 
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demand for relief." (Sill's Brief, pp. 16-17 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 303 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added)). 
• 'The original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced 
under codes or Rules of Civil Procedure." (Sill's Brief, p. 17 (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 258 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added)). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[a] civil action is commenced (1) 
by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together with a copy 
of the complaint in accordance with rule 4." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). The Court must 
presume that the Legislature acted purposefully and advisedly in choosing to use the 
phrase "service of a complaint" on the homeowner in Subsection (4)(a), meaning 
(according even to Sill's own above-quoted definitions) service of the initial pleading by 
a plaintiff that starts a civil action, as distinguished from a counterclaim which is defined 
as the diametric opposite of a "complaint," specifically, "[a] claim presented by a 
defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff." Black's Law 
Dictionary 349 (6th ed. 1990). 
Sill cites three purported authorities in support of his argument that counterclaims 
should be treated as a "complaint" for purposes of Subsection (4)(a): Harman v. Yeager, 
103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 696 (1943); Kane v. Kane, 558 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (A.D. 
1990); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1184 at 24-25 (3d ed. 2004). 
None of those authorities, however, have any application to this case. They all were 
speaking merely to the pleading standards required for counterclaims (i.e., that they must 
state sufficient facts to support a claim for relief, as distinguished from merely stating a 
defense to a plaintiffs complaint). None of them dealt with Subsection (4)(a), nor with 
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any other similar statute specifying requirements applicable to a particular pleading. On 
that point, the most closely analogous case to the case at bar of which Hart is aware is the 
case relied upon by the trial court in its Decision: Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal 
Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2003). In that case, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals was faced with a question of whether a counterclaim that was financed 
by an employer was barred by a statute stating that "[n]o labor organization shall limit the 
right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court... provided further, That 
[sic] no interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, 
encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action ...." Pelella, 350 F.3d at 
80 (emphasis added). The Pelella court correctly held that it did not, explaining: 
The word "action," without more, is arguably broad enough to 
encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims 
We need not decide, however, whether the word "action," standing 
alone, embraces Pelella's counterclaim for the purposes of section 
101 (a)(4)'s second proviso. "[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or 
not depends on context." In the statutory context of section 101(a)(4), the 
word "action is qualified by the phrase "to institute." 
A party institutes an action when he commences a judicial 
proceeding. A party commences a judicial proceeding when he takes the 
first step that invokes the judicial process. 
An action is therefore instituted when a plaintiff files a complaint as 
that constitutes the first step invoking the judicial process. In sharp 
contrast, a defendant asserts a counterclaim in response to a plaintiffs 
institution of an action. A counterclaim, by definition, is a "claim for relief 
asserted against an opposing party after an original claim has been made." 
Counterclaims are therefore "generally asserted in the answer" to a 
previously filed complaint. 
In other words, a defendant does not "institute" an action when he 
asserts a counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by 
filing a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the 
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer, in which he can 
include a claim for relief against the opposing party. [Pelella, 350 F.3d at 
81-82 (citations deleted) (emphasis added)]. 
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Pelella therefore confirms that the word "action" in Subsection (4)(a), that is at 
issue in this case, must be read in context, and that it is indeed qualified by that section's 
use of the word "complaint." It also confirms that a "complaint" is properly considered 
as something "in sharp contrast" from a counterclaim. Pelella confirms, therefore, that 
Subsection (4)(a) simply does not apply to this case in which Hart did not file this 
"action" nor serve a "complaint." 
Sill argues that the statement in Harman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 
696 (1943), that a counterclaim is "an original action, instituted by the defendant against 
the plaintiff," (Sill's Brief, p. 18), governs this case rather than Pelella, and that Hart's 
Counterclaim was therefore the filing of an "action" by Hart and is within the scope of 
Subsection (4)(a). To the contrary, however, Pelella actually is more instructive to this 
case than is Yeager. To begin with, Yeager merely held that a counterclaim must state 
facts that show a basis for relief under general pleading standards. It did not deal with 
any statutory language like that at issue in Subsection (4)(a) in this case, and it was 
decided prior to the 1951 adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
distinguish between the various pleadings as discussed more fully above. By contrast, 
the recent Pelella decision dealt specifically with a statute, like Subsection (4)(a) that is 
at issue in this case, which attached certain requirements and limitations only if a certain 
pleading was employed. Pelella therefore is right on point to this case, and it upholds the 
proposition, which governs in this case, that the statutory language must be followed. 
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Under the express language of Subsection (4)(a), even accepting as true for the 
sake of argument Sill's proposition that filing a counterclaim constitutes the filing of an 
"action," that still is only half of the analysis. Subsection (4)(a) does not apply merely 
when any "action" is filed by a lien claimant. It expressly applies only " i f the lien 
claimant files an "action" and serves a "complaint." By Sill's own definitions, a 
"complaint" is the initial pleading filed by a plaintiff to commence a civil action. But 
even if Hart' s Counterclaim constituted the filing of an "action," it still is not a 
"complaint," and Hart still never served any "complaint" upon Sill. Hart therefore still is 
not subject to Subsection (4)(a). 
B. Even If There Were Any Merit To Any Of Sill's Arguments, At Most 
They Would Merely Create Ambiguity As To The Meaning Of 
Subsection (4)(a), But Related Statutes and Legislative History 
Confirm The Trial Court's Interpretation That It Does Not Apply 
ToThisCase 
i. The Lien Recovery Fund Act that is referred to in 
Subsection (4)(a) of the mechanics' lien statute confirms that 
Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to this case 
It is well-established that when interpreting a statute the Court should look to "the 
plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12 f^ 
17, 66 P.3d 592 (emphasis added). It is highly significant to this case that 
Subsection (4)(a) only requires service of instructions and forms relating to the 
homeowner's "rights under [the] Lien Recovery Fund Act." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
1 l(4)(a)(i) & (ii) (2001). By his own admissions, Sill has no such rights. There is, 
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therefore, no requirement to serve him the instructions and forms referenced in 
Subsection (4)(a). 
The Lien Recovery Fund Act protects a homeowner from having to pay twice for 
the same improvements made to his home. It does so by stating that once a homeowner 
has paid his general contractor in full the homeowner and his home are then free from 
claims and liens of subcontractors who worked on the project. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-
11-107( 1) (2001) (providing for relief only against parties with contracts "other than 
directly with the owner"); id. 38-1 l-204(3)(b) (providing for relief only after the 
homeowner "has paid in full the original contractor"); id. 38-11-102(14) (defining 
"original contractor" as "a person who contracts with the owner of real property"). 
The Lien Recovery Fund Act has no bearing on the liens and claims of general 
contractors, and certainly not on the liens and claims of original or general contractors 
whom the homeowner has not paid in full. Since Sill himself admits that Hart was an 
original, general contractor, with whom he contracted directly, and since Sill did not pay 
Hart in full, Sill simply does not have any rights for relief under the Lien Recovery Fund 
Act in this case. Since Sill had no rights under the Lien Recovery Fund Act, 
Subsection (4)(a), on its face, did not require Hart to serve Sill with any instructions or 
summary judgment forms. Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a)(i) and (ii) (2001) (referencing 
serving instructions and forms "relating to the owner's rights" and "available rights" of 
the owner under the Lien Recovery Fund Act). See also e.g., Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 
781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating the law does not require one to do a 
vain or useless thing); Leger Const, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976) 
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(same). Subsection (4)(a)'s purpose for requiring the subcontractor to accompany the 
service of his lien foreclosure complaint on the homeowner with instructions and 
summary judgment forms is to allow the homeowner to quickly and easily, without 
necessarily having to incur the expense of retaining counsel, claim the benefit of the Lien 
Recovery Fund Act {i.e., removal of a subcontractor's lien) by simply completing the 
forms to swear and certify to the court that he has already paid in full the general 
contractor for the improvements. Sill could not have made any use of such instructions 
and forms even if they were served on him, and in any event already had an attorney and 
had initiated litigation. The forms therefore would have been useless and would not 
serve any purpose. 
Sill argues that it was improper for the trial court to consider as a part of its 
analysis the admitted fact that Sill has no rights and was not eligible for any relief under 
the Lien Recovery Fund Act. Sill claims that taking that into consideration somehow 
"simply reflects the court's disagreement with a legislative policy decision ... to require a 
lien claimant to give the Subsection (4)(a) notice to a homeowner who is sued by the lien 
claimant to enforce a mechanic's [sic] lien, whether or not the owner ultimately is 
eligible for relief under the [Lien Recovery Fund] Act" and that such policy disagreement 
"has no place in the process of statutory interpretation." (Sill's Brief, p. 20). To the 
contrary, however, the trial court's having taken into its consideration the fact that Sill 
was not entitled to any relief under the Lien Recovery Fund Act actually was a 
recognition and upholding of the express statutory language and the underlying 
legislative policy determination. In Subsection (4)(a) the Legislature determined that 
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homeowners (in the limited circumstances where Subsection (4)(a) otherwise applies due 
to the filing of a "complaint" by a lien claimant) be notified of their existing, "available" 
rights under the Lien Recovery Fund Act. Since Sill admittedly had no rights under the 
Lien Recovery Fund Act, there was nothing of which to notify him, and so no 
requirement to give any notice of anything, under Subsection (4)(a). 
Sill's citation to Gottlingv. PR. Inc., 2002 UT 95, 61 P.3d 989 for the proposition 
that the trial court's ruling was a mere case of judicial disagreement with a legislative 
policy determination actually is contrary to Sill's position. Since the language of 
Subsection (4)(a) on its face simply does not require it, it is really Sill's argument in this 
case that the Legislature should require all lien claimants to serve Lien Recovery Fund 
Act instructions and forms on all homeowners in all cases. As quoted by Sill, however, 
Gottling held that "[w]hat the legislature 'should' do is not the question. Rather it is what 
the legislature has done." Gottling, 2002 UT 95 f 23. On the face of Subsection (4)(a), it 
is clear that what the Legislature has done is to require service of certain Lien Recovery 
Fund Act instructions and forms only in certain limited cases, "if' the lien claimant is the 
one who "files an action" and serves a "complaint," and even then only to give notice of 
any available rights under the Lien Recovery Fund Act, of which Sill admits he had none 
in this case. Sill also argues that it should not be the lien claimant deciding whether the 
homeowner in a given case is eligible for relief under the Lien Recovery Fund Act, but 
rather the homeowner itself making that determination, "informed by the instructions and 
forms served in compliance with Subsection (4)(a)." (Sill's Brief, pp. 20-21). That 
argument, however, is tongue-in-cheek, since it is the courts who actually determine who 
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is eligible for relief under the Lien Recovery Fund Act, guided by the facts of each 
individual case. The indisputable, and indeed admitted, facts of this case are that Sill is 
not eligible for any relief under the Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
ii. The legislative history of Subsection (4)(a) further confirms 
that Hart was not subject to it 
The legislative history of Subsection (4)(a) confirms that it is only subcontractors 
whose liens and other collection rights are affected by the Lien Recovery Fund Act that is 
referenced in Subsection (4)(a), and therefore that it is only subcontractors who are 
required to provide the referenced Lien Recovery Fund Act instructions and forms. The 
Senate committee hearings and the Senate floor debates on the proposed addition of the 
requirement to serve those instructions and forms when Subsection (4)(a) was first 
adopted in 2001 both confirm that the requirement does not apply to cases like this one in 
which a general contractor is seeking payment in the first instance from the homeowner 
for services provided by the general contractor. See e.g., S.B. 254, 1st Substitution, 2001 
Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Business, Labor and Economic Development Standing 
Committee Meeting held 02/16/01 (stating the Lien Recovery Fund Act is designed to 
provide protection when a homeowner pays the general contractor who then fails to pay 
subcontractors); S.B. 254, 1st Substitution, 2001 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Floor Debate 
held 02/20/01 (stating the Lien Recovery Fund Act is aimed at "the situation of the 
innocent homeowner who pays [his general contractor] for the house, and then ... has to 
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pay for his house a second time" to remove a lien of a subcontractor whom the general 
contractor failed to pay). 
Likewise, when Subsection (4)(a) was amended in 2004 (to require service of 
only the instructions and form affidavit, deleting the requirement to serve a form 
summary judgment motion - see Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (4) (2004)), the Senate 
committee hearings and floor debates both again reiterated that the requirement to serve 
any of those forms only applies to subcontractors and suppliers not in direct privity of 
contract with the homeowner, and not to general contractors. See e.g., H.B. 32, H.B. 62, 
H.B. 182, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Business and Labor Standing Committee 
Meeting held 01/30/04 (noting the primary focus [of the Lien Recovery Fund Act 
referenced in Subsection (4)(a)] was designed to protect homeowners who deal with the 
general contractor, and pay the general contractor in full, from having liens filed against 
their property [by subcontractors] so that they would have to pay twice."); H.B. 32, H.B. 
62, H.B. 182, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Floor Debate held 02/04/04 (noting the Lien 
Recovery Fund Act was designed "to take care of the suppliers that couldn't get the 
money from the [general] contractor" whom the homeowner had paid in full). 
In order to give effect to the Legislature's intent, a general contractor must not be 
held to a requirement to serve inapplicable and useless instructions and forms upon a 
homeowner as a part of foreclosing his mechanics' lien, particularly where the express 
language of the statute does not require such service. See State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579, 
580 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 194 (Utah 1998) 
("'When we interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'"). The legislative history 
confirm what is clear on the face of the statute, that Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to 
the facts of this case involving a counterclaim filed by an unpaid general contractor. 
II. THE OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS CITED BY SILL REGARDING 
REQUIRED TERMS IN CONTRACTS AND LIENS DO NOT SHOW 
THAT SERVICE OF ADDITIONAL FORMS WAS REQUIRED BY HART 
IN THE LAWSUIT UNDER SUBSECTION (4)(a) 
Sill attempts to derive some significance for his claims in this case from the 
existence of statutory provisions regarding language that a contractor must include in its 
contract with a homeowner and regarding what information must be included in a 
mechanics' lien notice that is filed with the county recorder. 
First, Sill points to a portion of the Lien Recovery Fund Act, which states: 
Beginning July 1, 1995, the original contractor or real estate developer shall 
state in the written contract with the owner what actions are necessary for 
the owner to be protected under Section 38-11-107 [the Lien Recovery 
Fund Act] from the maintaining of a mechanic's lien or other civil action 
against the owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed 
for qualified services. [Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-108(1) (2001)]. 
Next, Sill points to a portion of the mechanics' lien statute stating: 
(2) The notice [of mechanics' lien that is recorded with the county 
recorder's office] shall contain a statement setting forth: . . . (h) if the lien is 
on an owner-occupied residence . . . a statement describing what steps an 
owner, as defined in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant 
to remove the lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107. [Id. § 38-1-7 
(2001)]. 
From these provisions Sill argues that it would be "odd, and ultimately 
unreasonable" (Sill's Brief, p. 13), for the court to conclude that information and notices 
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regarding Lien Recovery Fund Act rights would have to be provided by all contractors 
(general contractors and subcontractors alike) at the contract and lien stages, but would 
have to be provided at the litigation stage only if the lien claimant initiates the lawsuit 
and is a subcontractor. However, that is not odd or unreasonable at all in light of the 
language used in each respective statutory provision. Section 38-11-108(1), cited by Sill, 
specifically and expressly requires the "original contractor" to state in the written contract 
information regarding the Lien Recovery Fund Act. Section 38-1-7(2), also cited by Sill, 
expressly and unqualifiedly states that any notice of mechanics' lien "shall contain a 
statement setting forth" information regarding how the homeowner can remove a lien 
under the provisions of the Lien Recovery Fund Act. Had the Legislature intended 
Subsection (4)(a) to apply to an "original contractor" such as Hart, it would have said so 
expressly as it did in Section 38-1 l-108(i). And had the Legislature intended 
Subsection (4)(a) to apply in any lawsuit, it also would have said so as it did in 
Section 38-1-7(2) with respect to contents that must appear in all liens without 
qualification. The Legislature, however, did not do those things in Subsection (4)(a). 
Rather, in sharp contrast to such provisions, the plain language of Subsection (4)(a) 
shows the Legislature made the determination to, and expressly did, limit the 
circumstances in which Lien Recovery Fund Act instructions and forms must be provided 
in a litigation context. Specifically, the Legislature expressly required such items be 
served only "if" a lien claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint." Those 
distinctions between other provisions cited by Sill and Subsection (4)(a) must be upheld 
and enforced by this Court. 
As the trial court correctly recognized, (Decision, p. 4 n.5, Addendum No. 1 
hereto), there is very good reason as to why the Legislature chose to limit the 
circumstances in which Lien Recovery Fund Act instructions and forms must be given in 
litigation settings. Those instructions and forms are intended to aid the homeowner to 
quickly remove a subcontractor's lien from his home, without the necessity of the 
homeowner hiring an attorney and incurring legal fees and costs, when the homeowner 
has already paid in full the general contractor for the improvements to his home. In such 
cases, the instructions and forms allow the homeowner to very simply, and without the 
requirement of incurring the costs of hiring an attorney, defeat the alleged lien of a 
subcontractor, so the homeowner does not end up paying the subcontractor as well as the 
general contractor, thus being forced to pay twice for the same improvements. There is 
of course no need whatsoever for such instructions or forms where the homeowner 
himself, as in this case, is the one who initiated the lawsuit against a general contractor 
rather than a subcontractor, and has already retained an attorney for that purpose and 
admittedly has no rights to obtain any relief pursuant to the referenced instructions and 
forms. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTION (4)(a) 
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERARCHING PURPOSE OF THE 
MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES AND SHOULD BE UPHELD 
Sill begins his argument with the proposition that the provisions of 
Subsection (4)(a) are mandatory, and therefore are "jurisdictional." He argues that any 
failure by Hart to comply with Subsection (4)(a) would operate as a bar to enforcement of 
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Hart's mechanics' lien and deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over Hart's mechanics' 
lien Counterclaim. Sill's labeling of the issue as "jurisdictional" does not change the 
analyses set forth above. Subsection (4)(a) simply does not apply to this case on its face. 
Moreover, it is well-settled in Utah that in determining whether a statutory condition is 
"mandatory" (and therefore is jurisdictional) the "statute should be construed according 
to its subject matter and the purpose for which it was enacted...." Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 
797 (Utah 1977) (explaining that in determining whether a statute's requirements are 
jurisdictional the "statute" should be viewed in harmony with the general rule of statutory 
construction: That it should be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose."). 
It has been long and repeatedly recognized that the intent and purpose of Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes, of which Subsection (4)(a) is a part, "manifestly has been to 
protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter 
into the construction of a building or other improvement." John Wagner Assoc, v. 
Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Utah courts further have held 
that "to effect that purpose, the law is to be construed broadly." Butter field Lumber, Inc. 
v. Peterson Mortgage. Corp., 815 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis 
added). The trial court's interpretation that Subsection (4)(a) is inapplicable to this case, 
is in conformity with the express language of Subsection (4)(a) itself, as well as its 
legislative history, and serves the intended end and purpose of the mechanics' lien 
statutes to protect those, such as Hart, who perform labor and furnish materials for the 
improvement of real property. 
Although Sill concedes that protection of those who improve real property is 
indeed the "clear" purpose of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes, (Sill's Brief, p. 12), he 
argues that the intended purpose of Subsection (4)(a) is to protect homeowners from 
improper mechanics' liens by requiring that lien claimants inform owners of rights under 
the Lien Recovery Fund Act. As shown above, however, to the extent that may arguably 
be a purpose of Subsection (4)(a), it clearly and expressly applies in limited 
circumstances only which simply are not present in this case. 
Sill's arguments for application of Subsection (4)(a) to bar Hart's mechanics' lien 
Counterclaim because Hart did not serve with his Counterclaim various instructions and 
forms regarding a summary judgment procedure that Sill admits was completely 
inapplicable to this case and of absolutely no use or value to him is contrary to the 
express language of Subsection (4)(a) itself, its legislative history, and the intent and 
purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes in general. This Court should therefore reject 
Sill's arguments and uphold the trial court's well-reasoned Memorandum Decision 
(Addendum No. 1 hereto) ruling that Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly interpreted Subsection (4)(a) as being inapplicable to Hart 
on the facts of this case. Subsection (4)(a) specifically and expressly applies only "if' the 
lien claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint" on a homeowner to foreclose a 
mechanics' lien. As the defendant in the case that was filed by Sill, Hart obviously and 
indisputably did not file this action nor did he ever serve any complaint upon Sill. Sill's 
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arguments for treating Hart's Counterclaim as a "complaint" for purposes of 
Subsection (4)(a) are unsupportable even under his own cited authorities, and contrary to 
well-recognized and admittedly dispositive rules of statutory construction. 
Subsection (4)(a) also does not apply to this case since it references service only of forms 
relating to rights under the Lien Recovery Fund Act, of which Sill admits he had none as 
against Hart, so there was nothing required to be served on Sill in any event. 
Any interpretation of Subsection (4)(a) to apply to counterclaims of unpaid 
general contractors such as Hart would be inappropriately contorting the language 
appearing on the face of Subsection (4)(a) itself, its legislative history, and the related 
Lien Recovery Fund Act. Such interpretation urged by Sill also is contrary to the 
underlying purpose of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes to protect those, such as Hart, who 
provide labor and materials for the improvement of real property, and would result in a 
substantial and inappropriate windfall to Sill. 
For each of the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the trial court's 
Decision and Order declaring Subsection (4)(a) inapplicable to this case. Hart 
respectfully requests that the Court hear oral argument in this case. 
^su^ 1 noc 11 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A ' d a y of July, 2005. 
(J^T^O/y/^ /Ctf/^ 
*7l3ruce Badger 
Robert J. Dale 
Bradley L. Tilt 
Fabian & Clendenin, PC 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant/ 
Appellee Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, and of the Addenda that 
follow this page, were mailed by first-class mail with postage fully prepaid this>£/ oay 
of July, 2005, to: 
David B. Thompson 
Miller, Vance & Thompson, P.C. 
2200 North Park Avenue, Suite D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, Utah 84068 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
In the Third Judicial District Court 
Summit County, State of Utah 
JOEL SILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALLIE J. SILL and DOES I-X, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 020500012 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
From October 13-22, 2004, Defendant and Counterclaimant, Bill Hart d/b/a Bill Hart 
Construction ("Hart"), and Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Joel Sill ("Sill"), tried this matter 
to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in Hart's favor of $314,500.00 
on his unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien claims. 
Hart now seeks to reduce the verdict to a judgment. To this end, Hart has filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment Interest, 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Motion"). Sill opposes the Motion on the grounds that (1) "Hart's 
lien action is barred" because "Hart failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11 (4)(a) (2001) 
when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill;"1 (2) Hart is not entitled to prejudgment interest 
and attorney's fees on his unjust enrichment claim; and (3) "Hart is entitled to only a portion of the 
costs he claims." Response to Motion, pp. 3 & 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court is of 
the view that Hart's lien claim is valid and that he is entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney's 
fees as a result. The Court is also of the view that Hart is entitled to a large part of his costs. 
]By stipulation the parties reserved for "post-verdict determination . . . [a]ny issues concerning 
Hart's compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's lien." 
Response to Motion for Entry of Judgment Upon Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of 
Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Response to Motion"), p. 2 (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Sill concedes that Hart is entitled to a judgment of $314,500.00 "for his unjust enrichment 
claim." Response to Motion, p. 2. He contests, however, Hart's entitlement to a judgment on his 
mechanics' lien claim. The nub of Sill's argument is that when Hart filed his counterclaim, he failed 
to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Section 11(4) of Utah's mechanics' lien statute 
(Title 38, Chapter 1), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under 
this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, 
the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on 
the owner of the residence: (i) instructions to the owner of the 
residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and (ii) a 
form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner 
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may 
exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the 
motion for summary judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after 
the service of the summons and complaint upon the nonpaying party, 
as defined in Section 3 8-11 -102, and the time for the nonpaying party 
to respond,..., has elapsed. 
* * * 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon 
the residence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2001)(emphasis added).2 Specifically, Sill argues that Hart never 
served him with the instructions and "form affidavit and motion for summary judgment" identified 
in Subsection (4)(a) when he filed his counterclaim. He further argues that this failure dooms Hart's 
request for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees because Hart is only entitled to the same if he 
prevails on his lien claim. 
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced above on Sill. He also readily 
admits that he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust 
enrichment claim. See, e.g., Motion, pp. 8 & 10-13. But he vigorously disputes the notion that 
Subsection (4) applies to this dispute. 
2The parties are in agreement that the mechanics' lien statute in place when Hart filed his 
counterclaim (February 2002) governs this dispute. See, e.g., Response to Motion, p. 3 n.l. 
2 
Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially dispositive of this issue and, 
therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule 
in their favor. According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an action to 
enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in Subsection (4). Not so, according to 
Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" and serves a 
"complaint" (versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct. 
"[W]hen interpreting a statute," a court "looks first to the statute's plain language to 
determine" legislative intent. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, U 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted). 
In doing so, it must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related statutes." Id. (citations omitted). And 
where the statute is clear, the court must not "assess the wisdom of the legislation," but must 
"implement the law as it reads unless it results in an absurd outcome." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 
P.2d 577, 586 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah Legislature 
limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner with the materials referenced in 
Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through 
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' without more is 
arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims" 
(Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'Int'I v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73,81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the reference to "service of the 
complaint."3 Second, this reference to a complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement 
of a lawsuit and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See, e.g., Local 
Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced (1) by filing of a complaint.. . , or (2) by service of a 
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from other 
pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it could have easily provided for 
it (e.g., by substituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)).4 
3Sill argues that the Utah Court of Appeals disposed of this issue in his favor in American Rural 
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997), when it held that the 
word "action" in Section 38-1-18 of the mechanics' lien statute included a counterclaim. Id., p. 193. 
Sill's reading ignores that there are no words or phrases in Section 18 that restrict the word "action" in 
anyway. Indeed, the current statute references "any action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Sill also 
ignores that the American Rural Cellular decision is in harmony with the purpose of the mechanics' lien 
statute, while his suggested interpretation is not. Infra, pp. 4-5; American Rural Cell., 939 P.2d at 193. 
4Sill counters that the reference to a "summons and complaint" in Subsection (4)(b) is proof that 
the Legislature intended the reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) be broadly construed. Sill's 
conclusion just does not follow. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may not move for 
summary judgment until "the expiration of 20 days from commencement of the action." Subsection 4(b) 
simply makes clear that the motion for summary judgment identified in Subsection (4)(a) is not subject to 
the same restraint. 
3 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' 
Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, is instructive. There, the Second Circuit was confronted with the 
question of whether the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") barred an 
employee's counterclaim because it was financed by an "interested employer." Under Section 
101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, an employee could not "institute an action" that was financed by an 
"interested employer." Therefore, the union argued, Pelella could not maintain his employer-backed 
counterclaim. The Second Circuit, relying heavily on a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, disagreed. In doing so it noted that: 
[A] defendant does not "institute" an action when he asserts a 
counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by filing 
a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the 
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer,..., in which 
he can include a claim for relief against the opposing party. 
Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7, 350 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit further noted 
that this "narrow construction" better comported with legislative purpose, and that the "concerns" 
that Section 101(a)(4) "seeks to address" were lessened because, "[b]y taking the member to court, 
the union itself introduces the outside actor into what once had been an internal grievance and opens 
the door to some measure of interference." Id, pp. 84-85.5 
Sill counters that in Barman v. Yeagar Et Ux., 134 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1943), the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action . . . tested by the same 
tests and rules as a complaint." He further counters that Black's Law Dictionary defines "complaint" 
to include a counterclaim.6 While these arguments are not without some persuasive value, they do 
not carry the day. Moreover, accepting these arguments would only create an ambiguity-an 
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of Hart's construction. 
To the extent that a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate for a court to look beyond its 
language and to its legislative history7 and purpose. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted); State v. Burgess-Benyon, 2004 UT App 312, \ 7, 99 P.3d 
383 (citation omitted). With respect to the statute at hand, it is well established that its general 
purpose is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor 
or materials." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Developmentand Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289, 
5ln a similar fashion, the concerns -that Subsection (4) guards against are lessened when the 
homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal process by instituting suit against a lien 
claimant. 
6This is a secondary definition. The primary definition, at least according to Black's Law 
Dictionary, is "[t]he original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced." 
7Because neither party addressed the legislative history of Subsection (4), the Court assumes that 
it is either nonexistent or unhelpful. 
4 
291 (Utah 1986); see also Butter field Lumbar, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Assoc, 815 P.2d 1330, 
1334 (Utah 1991).8 That purpose is served by construing Subsection (4) narrowly and consistent 
with its plain language, as Hart urges.9 
Finally, the Court rejects Sill's alternative challenge to Hart's entitlement to prejudgment 
interest and awards Hart the same on his mechanics' lien claim. The Court also awards Hart 
attorney's fees (as prayed for and established by affidavit) and costs of suit (as described by the 
Court at the January 31,2005 hearing). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part. Counsel 
for Hart is to prepare, circulate, and submit a Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
zJ<*4 
Dated this ^-^-day of February, 2005, in Summit County, State of Utah. 
DENO G. HlMbN^S 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ g "N 
8It is important to note that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is 
animated by one general purpose and intent." Miller, 2003 UT at \ 17 (emphasis added) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
9Sill admits that he was not eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act. Nevertheless, he urges the Court to adopt an interpretation that would restrict Hart's 
ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide notice of an irrelevant 
statutory provision. While this point is certainly not dispositive, it does help emphasize that Sill's 
construction is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose. 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff Bill Hart 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOEL SILL, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
V. 
KALLEE J. SILL, and DOES I-X, 
Third Party Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER AND 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 020500012 
Judge Deno G. Himonas 
The Jury having rendered its verdict in this action on October 22, 2004, and the court 
having fully considered Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff Bill Hart's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and For Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment 
Interest, Attorneys Fees and Costs, three supporting joint affidavits in support of motion for 
award of attorneys fees, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, and the related motion 
papers, and having fully considered Plaintiffs opposing memoranda, and having heard oral 
argument from Plaintiffs and Defendant's respective counsel on January 31, 2005, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters judgment consistent with the court's 
Memorandum Decision entered February 4,2005. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED AND DECLARED 
as follows: 
1. Bill Hart is awarded judgment in his favor and against Joel Sill, whose address is 
28 White Pine Canyon Road, Park City, Utah 84060, in the amount of $314,500, plus 
prejudgment interest of $98,480.88, plus costs of $5,598.92, plus reasonable attorneys fees in the 
amount of $199,225.75, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which are taxed as costs in this 
matter, for a total judgment of $617,805.55. 
2. This judgment shall bear interest from entry hereof at the post-judgment rate 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3). 
3. The Notice of Lien dated January 30, 2002, recorded on January 31, 2002, as 
Entry 00609900, in Book 1432, Page 511-512, of the official records of the Summit County 
Recorder, is a valid and enforceable lien against the property located in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described as follows (the "Property"), and Defendant Bill Hart is entitled to a foreclosure 
of his lien on the Property: 
All of Homestead No. 15, The Colony At White Pine Canyon, Phase 1 
Amended Final Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on 
file and of record in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
Also together with and subject to all rights, benefits, encumbrances 
and obligations set forth in the grant of easements recorded September 
28,1998 as Entry No. 518627 in Book 1186 at Page 128 of the official 
records. 
Parcel #CWPC-15 -AM 
4. The Property is hereby foreclosed pursuant to Defendant's lien, and the Property, 
or such amounts as may be sufficient to pay the amounts due under this judgment and decree, 
together with accruing costs and interest, be sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit 
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by Utah law for the sale of real property as in 
the case of foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Joel Sill, and Third Party Defendants, including 
Kallie J. Sill, and each of them, and all persons and entities claiming by, through or under them 
or any of them, have no further estate, right, title, lien, or other interest of any kind in, on, or to 
the Property, except a right of redemption as the case may be as provided by law. Provided, 
however, that the Property be foreclosed and sold subject to any unnamed, non-party person or 
entity that holds any mortgage or interest that is prior to the interests of Defendant. Any party to 
this action may bid for the Property at the sale. 
5. That all persons claiming under Plaintiff Joel Sill or Third Party Defendant Kallie 
Sill, whose interests do not appear of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office as of 
Defendant's filing of the lis pendens of this action, are barred and foreclosed of all right, title, 
interest and equity of redemption in the Property. 
6. The Sheriff, upon sale of the Property, shall distribute the proceeds from the sale 
as follows: 
a. to pay the Sheriffs cost of sale, disbursements and commissions; 
b. to pay to Bill Hart or his attorneys the accrued and accruing costs and 
attorneys fees of this action, together with the remaining amounts owing Bill Hart for the 
total judgment as set forth in paragraph 1 above; 
c. any surplus after payment of the amount set forth above be accounted for and 
paid over by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court pending further order by this Court. 
7. The person or entity purchasing the Property at the sheriffs sale thereof shall 
receive a Certificate of Sale from the sheriff and shall, subject to the rights of redemption, be 
entitled to immediate possession of the Property and the right to receive and collect all rents 
therefrom. 
8. After the time allowed by law for redemption has expired, the Sheriff shall 
execute and deliver a Sheriffs Deed (the "Deed") to the purchaser at the sheriffs sale or the 
person entitled thereto, as provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The grantee named 
therein shall thereupon be entitled to and have possession of the Property. 
9. Defendant Bill Hart is hereby awarded a deficiency judgment against Plaintiff 
Joel Sill for any and all deficiencies remaining due after applying the net proceeds derived from 
the foreclosure sale of the Property to the judgment as herein provided. 
10. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys 
fees incurred by Defendant Bill Hart in collecting this judgment, by execution or otherwise, as 
shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this ^ d a y of Jjfa 
Third DistrictvQourt 
Approved as to form: 
T6^L^. 
Christina I. Miller, Esq. 
David B. Thompson, Esq. 
Miller, Vance & Thompson, P.C 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Joel Sill 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant Kallie J. Sill 
